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Willard v. Berry-Hinckley Indus., 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 53 (Aug. 6, 2020)1
NRCP 6-(b)(1) MOTIONS AND THE YOCHUM FACTORS
Summary
In an opinion drafted by Justice Hardesty, the Nevada Supreme Court considered whether
district courts must apply the Yochum factors when determining if an NRCP 60(b)(1) motion has
established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that sufficient grounds exist to set aside a final
judgment, order, or proceeding.2 The Court concluded that the Yochum factors must be applied to
any NRCP 60(b)(1) motion, not just those involving a default judgment, to determine if the movant
established excusable neglect.
Background
This case arose out of cause of actions regarding the alleged breach of a lease agreement
for a commercial property in Reno between appellant Mr. Willard and respondents Berry-Hinckley
Industries and Mr. Jerry Herbst. Willard’s legal counsel, Brian Moquin, failed to comply with
NRCP 16.1 disclosure requirements, discovery requests, and court orders during litigation.3 Based
on these violations, the district court dismissed Willard’s claims with prejudice and granted
Respondents’ motion for sanctions.
Willard subsequently retained new counsel and filed the NRCP 60(b)(1) motion and argued
that Moquin’s alleged psychological disorder justified NRCP 60(b)(1) relief based on excusable
neglect. Willard’s argument was based on the four factors announced in Yochum.4 In Yochum, the
Court held that a district court must apply four factors when deciding on a NRCP 60(b)(1) motion
to determine whether the movant has met its burden of proof: "(1) a prompt application to remove
the judgment; (2) the absence of an intent to delay the proceedings; (3) a lack of knowledge of
procedural requirements; and (4) good faith."5
The district court ultimately denied Willard’s NRCP 60(b)(1) motion and stated that the
Yochum factors were only applicable to NRCP 60(b)(1) motions that concerned relief from a
default judgment, not relief from an order.
Discussion
The Court acknowledged that appellate courts generally give district courts wide discretion
in ruling on NRCP 60(b)(1) motions; however, a district court abuses that discretion when it
disregards established legal principles.6 Here, to determine whether the district court abused its
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discretion, the Court first looked at the plain meaning of the statute. NRCP 60(b)(1) provides that
a district court may “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding" based on a finding of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."7 The
Court determined the plain language does not differentiate between relief from a "final judgment,
order, or proceeding" as the district court in this case claimed.8
The Court then found that the caselaw reviewing district courts’ NRCP 60(b)(1)
determinations also does not differentiate between relief from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding when determining whether to apply the Yochum factors.9 Based on these findings, the
Court explicitly held that district courts are required to issue explicit factual findings, preferably
in writing, on all four Yochum factors when determining NRCP 60(b)(1) motions. Therefore,
because the four Yochum factors were not applied with regard to Willard's NRCP 60(b)(1) motion,
the Court concluded the district court abused its discretion in denying that motion.
Conclusion
The Court concluded that district courts must issue explicit and detailed findings,
preferably in writing, with regard to the four Yochum factors in order to facilitate the appellate
review of NRCP 60(b)(1) determinations for an abuse of discretion. The Court determined that the
district court abused its discretion when it failed to address the Yochum factors, and therefore, the
Court reversed the district court's order denying the NRCP 60(b)(1) motion and remanded the case
to the district court for further consideration.
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